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a method of protecting the private key in which the secret stored in the laptop cannot be used to
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Absfmcl-Mobile IP Onternet Protocol) enables access to the
Internet anywhere with one IP address, hence, providing the
flexibility that is required by today’s growing mobile work
force. Deploying Mobile IP introduces new security h a t s
that if not carefully addressed can have severe consequences
for home organizations. IPSec is a commonly used protection
mechanism that is employed in this context. IPSec requires a
flexible key management scheme to provide cryptographic keys
to communicating entities. A commonly used public key based
key management system is SKIP (Simple Key-Management for
Internet Protocols). In this paper we consider the scenario where
a laptop that is enabled with secure Mobile IP connection using
SKIP, is stolen and the aim is to protect the private key stored in
the laptop. We propose a method of protecting the private key in
which the secret stored in the laptop cannot be used to determine
the private key. We also introduce a method of ‘disabling’ the
stored secret such that even when the laptop is stolen, there is
no need for changing the private key. An important property of
our system is that it does not add extra messages to the existing
SKIP implementation.

I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile IP [l] allows a mobile node to use the same IP
address while roaming between networks. As the user changes
its point of attachment to the network, the data packets are
dynamically directed to the routers that are able to deliver
the packets to the user. Mobile IP provides the seamless
connectivity that is required by many applications, and can
he used to enforce IP-based access control on nodes. In
a Mobile IP system there are three main types of entities:
Mobile Nodes, Foreign Agents and Home Agents. A mobile
node must register with the home agent, which will store this
information in a routing table, called a binding table, to route
packets to the node.
Mobile IP may he deployed over Intranets, or over wide
area networks and the Internet. If Mobile IP is used over
an unprotected Intranet, data packets may pass through insecure links, where packet content might he eavesdropped or
modified. When Mobile IP is used over wide area networks
and the Internet, a new problem is the traversal of packets
through the firewall. Packets require tunnelling at the mobile
nodes and de-tunnelling at the home agent or the firewall.
Security of these tunnels and ensuring that they are estahlished
between authenticated parties and their contacts are authentic
is an important security issue. To provide security in Mobile
IP, cryptographic mechanisms such as IPSec [3], [4] are
used. A commonly used method for providing secure keys
is SKIP (Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocol [5]).
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An important advantage of using SKIP is that key information
can be communicated in-line, that is as part of the IP packet.
Under SKIP, a mobile node requires a pair of private and
public keys. The private key is known only to the node, while
the public key is public. A node uses its private key together
with the public key of another node to calculate a common
key with that node. A mobile node must be able to securely
access its private key. One alternative is to use tamper-proof
storage, such as a smart card, to store the key and require
the device that implements Mobile IP to access the key
through a secure reader. This method has the inconvenience
and expense of requiring a reader device. Software smart
cards [27] camouflage the key in the software and so can
expend with the card reader at the cost of lower security.
A commonly used alternative is to store the key information
on the device encrypted with a key which is derived from a
password known to the user. This allows a legitimate user who
knows the password to access the key. However, encrypting
the key with a secret password leaves the system open to offline password attack. In this paper we consider a stolen laptop
that implements Mobile IP and our aim is to protect user’s
private key against this attack. We assume the laptop uses
IPSec and SKIP, and show a method of securing SKIP private
key such that a lost device does not compromise the key. An
important property of our system is that the key information
can he included in the SKIP header.
We also show how to ‘disable’ the secret stored on the
laptop such that, without changing the private key, the stored
secret in the stolen laptop become of no use to the adversary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
11, we give an overview of Mobile IP, its security and current protection mechanisms. In section 111, we introduce the
problem and show that the known solutions are inadequate.
In section IV, we describe a solution. Section V concludes
the paper.

11. PRELIMINARIES
Mobile IP [l] is a network layer protocol designed over
the Internet Protocol (IP) to enable mobility; that is allowing
a node to change its point of attachment to the network
while maintaining its connection. A Mobile IP address has
two parts: a home address that is used as the permanent
IP address of the node, and a care-of-address that changes
according to the mobile node location. The latter is used for
routing purposes. Two mobiliq agents, called home agent and
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foreign agent, are used to establish the association between
the mobile node and a correspondent node, which is a
node that wants to communicate with the mobile node. The
correspondent node can be a fixed node or a mobile node.
The two agents are routers on the home network, and foreign
network, respectively.
To use the Mobile 1P outside the home network, the mobile
node obtains a care-of-address from the network that it is
visiting and registers this address with its home agent. A
care-of-address can be either the 1P address of the foreign
agent, or a temporary address assigned to the mobile node
in the foreign network, for example through DHCP [6] or
PPP [7]. The two care-of-addresses are called foreign agent
and collocafed care-of-address, respectively. The home agent
updates the care-of-address of the mobile node in its binding
table.
Packets from a correspondent node will be received by the
home agent and tunnelled to the registered care-of-address,
The foreign agent then de-tunnels packets and sends them
to the mobile node. Tunnelling encapsulates Mobile IP’s
packets. For example, in IP-within-IP [SI the original Mobile
IP packet is treated as the payload, while the home agent and
the care-of-address are used as the source and destination of
the encapsulated packet. Route optimization [9] is provided in
extensions of the basic protocol and allows the correspondent
node to send packets directly to the mobile node rather than
traversing through the home agent. This reduces the required
bandwidth and is particularly efficient in cases that the mobile
node is close to the correspondent node.
Mobile IP inherits IP security problems and introduces new
security and privacy concerns.
A. Security Issues in Mobile IP
We focus on security issues that are specific to Mobile 1P.
Mobile IP can be deployed over an Intranet, or over a wide
area network and the Internet.
If Mobile IP is used in an Intranet environment, without
connection to the Internet, confidentiality and authenticity
of packets must be guaranteed. Otherwise, not only security
of the data is lost but also integrity of connections will be
endangered. For example, modification of registration requests
by a malicious router, which reports its own address as
the care-of address for the mobile node will divert traffic
and result in all packets from a correspondent node being
tunnelled to the malicious node, hence a denial of service
attack. Other attacks include replay of registration requests
by a malicious node, and stealing established sessions [2].
Authentication is also required in route optimization and
without it an adversary can create fraudulent binding update
packets to redirect the traffic.
If Internet-wide mobility is considered, the problem of
traversing the firewall needs to be addressed as well. Firewalls
use Ingress Filtering [12] to filter inbound packets based
on their source address and so will discard packets whose
network address is the same as the home network. Packets
sent by a mobile node when it is outside the home network

will appear as inbound traffic with the IP address of an internal
node and will be blocked. To overcome this problem Reverse
Tunnelling [13] is used. Mobile nodes’ packets are sent to
the home agent before being forwarded to the correspondent
node. This uses a method similar to tunnelling [l] but in the
reverse order. However, the firewall must be sure that the
tunnelled packets are from legitimate node [14].
In genera1 Mobile IP packets although they have the IP
address of the internal network, cannot be assumed to have
the same level of protection as packets in the internal network,
since the packets might come from a foreign network and
traverse through the Internet. In all above cases cryptographic
mechanisms are used for providing the secured packets.

B. Security Mechanisms in Mobile IP
Mobile IP provides authentication by including a cryptographic field in registration packets. The default authentication
algorithm is HMAC-MDS [l]. There are 3 kinds of authentication extensions: a mandatory extension between the mobile
node and the home agents, and optional extensions between
the mobile node and the foreign agent, and between the home
agent and the foreign agent.
lPSec is used to establish a secure connection (tunnel)
between a remote mobile node and the internal network [U][20]. A secure connection between a mobile node and a
home network may be through one IPSec tunnel between
the node and the firewall, or the home agent, or two IPSec
tunnels between the mobile node and the Foreign Agent, and
between the mobile nodes and the home agent. IPSec requires
a scalable key management system. The two commonly used
standards are ISAKMP [lo] and SKIP [5]. Although the
former is adopted by IETF as the mandatory key management
standard (IKE [ll]), it is a session oriented protocol and
has the overhead of establishing a session. In this paper we
consider SKIP a protocol that bundles the key information
into the data packet and so does not have this overhead.
111. STOLEN LAPTOP PROBLEM

A. Motivation

A mobile node is typically a laptop or a handheld device,
which can he easily stolen and so the secret key of the device
must be carefully protected and deployed. For example, if a
laptop connection to the home network is naively automated
such that upon switching on the device, the authentication
protocol is automatically executed, its confiscation by a malicious user will completely compromise the home network.
SKIP requires the mobile node to have a pair of public and
private keys. A common way of protecting the private key is
to use a password to encrypt it and store the encrypted form
o n the device. However, because the public key is known
by everyone, an attacker can launch an off-line password
guessing attack to find the private key. The attack can be
described as follows.
Let E k ( ) be a symmetric key encryption algorithm used to
encrypt the private key, and let Ilk() denote the corresponding
decryption algorithm. k is the common key used by the two
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algorithms such that for a message x,we have Dk(Ek(z))
=
x. Also, let E p k ( ) and D s k ( ) denote a public key encryption algorithm using the public key pk, and a decryption
algorithm using the private key sk, where for a message x,
Dsk(Epk(x)) = x. In an off-line password (key) guessing
attack, the attacker has X = Eh(&) and his aim is to find
sk. For this, the attacker will try all possible passwords, k,one
at a time, and for each password k, (i) finds U = D k ( X ) ;(ii)
If the equality holds,
for a text x, checks x 2 DU(Epk(z)).
the attacker has found the private key; otherwise the next
password is tried. The attack works because of the ‘verifiable
texts’ that is generated through the decryption process.
We assume the SKIP protocol is used for IPSec and the
setting is similar to [17], [la].

the proposal is that the required security does not need extra
messages and the added security is obtained by extending the
SKIP header.

B. Related work
Perlman and Kaufman [24] proposed to download the
private key from a protected server. Their protocol needs the
server to he fully trusted and at least two messages to be
exchanged.
To reduce trust on the server and also protect against
possible server compromise, the use of multiple servers [25],
[26] has been proposed. The private key is divided into shares
and each share is stored in one of the servers. The adversary
has to compromise all servers to be able to retrieve the private
key. The increased security is at the cost of more computation
and communication with servers and so is unacceptable for
many applications.
Mackenzie and Reiter [28] proposed a method of protecting
private keys in network enabled devices. Their system does
not require a trusted server and has provable security. Their
construction can be used with any public key encryption and
signature scheme. They also proposed a second protocol that
is specific to RSA signature and El Gama1 encryption. This
protocol allows key disabling which is particularly useful if
the secret key has already been downloaded onto the device
and the only way to protect against the misuse of the key when
the laptop is stolen, is to disable the key. The main drawback
of their schemes is the need for additional messages.

A4

C. Our Contributions
We propose an extension of SKIP to provide security
against the compromise of the mobile device, that allows
secure connection from outside and inside of the home network. We propose two protocols: the erternal IPSec protocol,
which is used when the laptop is outside the home network
and the internal IPSec protocol which is used when the
laptop is located inside the home network (see the proposed
solution section for more detail). The internal protocol has the
following properties: the server does not need to be trusted;
no initialization per user is required; and public keys are
truly public. The last point contrasts with [27] which, while
having similar functionalities, required the device’s public key
to be unknown by the device. The external protocol provides
key disabling property whilst preserving confidentiality of the
private key even if the laptop is stolen. The main advantage of

IV. THESCHEME
First we introduce notation and provide relevant hackground.

Notations
Let E k ( ) and D k ( ) denote encryption and decryption
algorithms and k denote the secret key.
Let C = E k ( M ) denote the cryptogram corresponding
to M. We use C c & ( M ) to denote that the result
of encryption is assigned to the variable C. D k ( ) takes a
ciphertext C as input and outputs either a message M, if C
i s a valid encryption of M, or otherwise retums I,we let
:= { M , I}.

Let C,,,(),Epk() and D s k ( ) denote the key generation,
encryption and decryption algorithms of an asymmetric encryption system, respectively. G,,,(t) takes a security parameter l! that determines the security level of the system,
and outputs a public and private key pair (pk,sk);that is
(pk,sk) t Genc(t). E p k ( ) takes a public key (pk) and a
message A t as input and outputs the encrypted value C of M,
that is C t Epk(M).D a k ( )takes a ciphertext C and a secret
key (sk) as input and outputs either a message -M, if C is a
valid encryption of M or rehlrns Iotherwise, M c V S k ( C )
where M := {M, I}.
Let x E R S denote a value x, randomly takes from a set
S. The ring of integers modulo a number n is denoted by Z,,
and its multiplicative group, which contains only the integers
relatively prime to n is denoted, by Z:,
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
The first practical key agreement was proposed by Diffie
and Hellman [29]. The protocol allows two parties to establish
a shared secret over an insecure channel without having a
shared key in advance. The protocol is as follows. To obtain
a common key, Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and a
primitive element g E 2;.Each participant selects hisher
own secret a and b, a, b E Zp-1. Then, Alice sends W, to
Bob and Bob sends Wb to Alice via an authenticated channel,
where W, = ga (mod p) and Wb = g b (mod p ) . Given
W,, it is assumed to be hard to find a E Zp-l.
This is known
as the discrete logarithm assumption [31]. Finally, Alice
computes the shared key KAB = W,” = (9’)” (mod p).
Bob can compute the same key K A =
~ W, =
(mod P ) .
This protocol is vulnerable to a “man in the middle”
attack [32]. To protect against this attack, the shared key must
be authenticated. This can be achieved by incorporating public
key cryptography [31].
Public-key Certificate System
A Public-key certificate system is a system which consists
of the components necessary to securely distribute the public
key [23]. Examples include secure DNS [21] and X.509
directory lookup [22].
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p , q are prime
g E Z;, where g is a primitive element
1. select n E R Z,, where r denotes a user’s password
2. selecl i E R Z,, where i denotes a laplop’s private key
3. select p and 6, where p , 6 ER Z,, and 0 6 = i (mod 4 )
4. wmpute: 0
E,(@)

Deploying SKIP in Mobile IP

Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocols (or SKIP,
for short) [SI is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Users’
public keys, g’,g’, are authenticated through a public key
certificate system. SKIP does not need extra messages. Cryptographic information is included as part of the SKIP header
and sent along with the encrypted payload. The receiver uses
the source IP address of the received packets to determine
the sender’s public key. SKIP allows the sender to specify
alternative IP addresses. This is very useful for mobile nodes
to specify their care-of-address.
To compute a session key when the network is protected
by the firewall, the mobile node must obtain its private key
together with the public key of the firewall. This session key
will be used to encrypt the shared key which will be used for
future communication. The firewall will calculate the same
session key in a similar way, using the mobile node’s public
key.
Due to space limitations, more details about SKIP and its
deployment with Mobile IP are omitted.

-

+

Firewall s t o m

Laptop slores
#

6

Pmtocol 1 : External WSee Connection: Initialization Phase

stored in the laptop’s hard disk. The user password R and the
components of the private key ( i ,p, 6) must be erased from
the volatile memory. This phase is illustrated in Protocol 1.

2. Key Generation Phase

The purpose of this IPSec connection is to authenticate
packets at the firewall while preserving their confidentiality.

7. K M N - F W

+

A Simple but Insecure Scheme
Let i and R denote a laptop’s private key and the user’s
password respectively. If B c E,(i) is stored in the laptop,

P)

8. < a,SKIP header,SKIP payload

>

+

9. receive 8 = (< i 7 , i,s’ >)
IO. obtain the laptop’s public key
‘)i

from PKI

11. wmputegp =

-

3
(modp)
9 -

12. abort if g* # gi.<gP)8 (mad p)
13. K M N - F W

(go)?

(mod

PI.

j denotes the firewall’s private key
14. lPSec connection starts here

A Secure Scheme

+

( ~ F w ) (mod
~

SKIP process wntinues here

an adversary can perform an off-line dictionary attack as
described in section 111-A. That is, the adversary randomly
chooses a password from his dictionary list and uses it to
decrypt B. That is, = D+(B).He can verify whether his guess
- 7
is correct by verifying whether g‘ = g’ (mod p), where g i
is publicly available in the PIU directory.

1. Initialization Phase
First, the laptop’s private key i and the user’s password ?I
are generated. Next, the private key a is split randomly into
two parts, and 6, where
6 = i (mod 4).6 is stored at
the firewall, and the encrypted version of p, B t E,(P), is

Store 6

+

A. First Scenario: The External IPSec Connection

The basic idea of ow scheme is to divide the laptop’s
private key into 2 parts. One part is encrypted with the user’s
password and stored on the laptop, while the other is stored
at the firewall. When a remote laptop is switched on, the user
enters his password, which is used to decrypt and obtain the
laptop’s part of the private key. Then, the laptop computes the
session key from this value and the firewall’s public key.
The firewall needs to be assured that the user knows
the correct password T . We use Schnorr’s indirect proof of
knowledge [30] techniques to show this knowledge. After
successful verification, the firewall computes the session key
from its private key, its stored private key part of this laptop
and the laptop’s public key.
The protocol has two phases: the initialization phase and
the key generation phase.

Firewall

Laptop
1. uer enters password ii,
where iiE Z,
2. select T and s,
where T, s E R Z,
3. wmpule : c Dp(!)
4. wmpute : 7 = T 0 s (mod y)
5 . a =(<g7,7,s>)
6. obtain the firewall’s
public key ~ F Wfrom PKI

Pmtoeol 2: External WSee Connection: Key Generation Phase

a

First, the user needs to enter his password R so that
can be found. Then, the mobile node finds CY,
where a t (<
gy, T , s >). y is computed as r+p.s (mod q), where T and s
are random numbers. The session key is computed from and
the firewall public key q F W . That is, K M N - F W+ ( ~ F w ) ~
(mod p ) . where q p w = gj (mod p). CY is sent together with
the SKIP packet.
The fiewall verifies the authenticity of R by incorporating
Schnorr’s i?direct proof of knowledge as follows: the firewall
computes go from q i / g 6 (mod p), where pi is the laptop’s
public key and qi = ga (modp), and compares if gy 2
gi. (gB)’ (mod p) holds.
If verification succeeds, the firewall will be convinced Of
the user’s identify, and computes the session key using g@
together with its private key U). That is, K M N - ~ +
W
(mod p ) . Otherwise, it will send a message to inform the user
that authentication has failed. If the firewall receives several

(do)’
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TABLE I1
M A I NDIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EXTERNALAND INTERNAL

TABLE I
M A I NDIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THEEXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL IPSEC
CONNECTIONS

PROTOCOLS

I External WSec I Internal IPSec
I the firewall
1 any node

Peer

Lacation
Server

User Authentication

outside the organi-

zation network
not required
(firewall stores 6)
at the firewail

fixed or mobile
inside the arganization network
required

Ticket

Private key

at Ule sewer

We allow mobile nodes to download their own 6 from
the server and assume the server is trusted. If the server is
untrusted, we can employ the ticket concept from [28]. That
is a public key encryption scheme is deployed to encrypt 6 to
form a ticket. This ticket is stored at the laptop. The public
key of the server is used as the encrypted key. Therefore, the
server in this scenario does not store 6, rather, it obtains 6
from the ticket sent by the laptop using its decryption key

failed requests from the same user within a short time period,
it will suspend the connection request from the user. This is
important to prevent the online dictionary attack.
Key Disabling Feature
We note that the private key i is not disclosed even though
the system is accessed by a valid user. We can obtain a key
disablingfunction, as defined in [28]. This allows the owner
of the laptop to reuse the same private and public key pair
for a new device. To disable the secret of the laptop, a Few
breakdqwn pf the private key i ‘:toA two components (p,6)
where p 6 = i (mod-qj and (p,6) # (p,6) will be used.
The new components (/3,6) result in valid operations using
the same public key gz.

sk,,,.

+

B. Second Scenario: The Internal IPSec Connection
When the Mobile IP enabled laptop is used inside the home
network, it can communicate with the other mobile nodes
directly without going through the firewall. To preserve the
confidentiality of the communication, we use secure IPSec
communication with the same private key as in the previous
protocol. However, we need to modify the protocol.
When the laptop uses the external IPSec connection, it
communicates directly with the firewall which stores 6. Therefore, the session key can be computed with the partial secret
key /3 only, without the need to reveal 6. This is because
the firewall has knowledge of 6. The situation is different
when the laptop is used within the home network and uses
the internal IPSec connection to communicate with another
mobile node without going through the firewall. Since the
other mobile node M,, does not know 6
~
,,,
it cannot
compute the session key. Similarly, the laptop does not know
6 ~ “To
. solve this problem, we introduce a server with a
function similar to the firewall for nodes inside the network.
The server will allow each node M, to download its own 6,.
This method is used instead of allowing the mobile node M,
to download ,IS
to avoid a collusion attack between Mn
and the adversary. Otherwise, M,’s user can reveal 61,pt,
to the adversary, which will later enable him to perform an
off-line attack when the laptop is stolen and taken outside the
network.
The differences between the external and internal IPSec
connection are illustrated in Table I.

We note that the private key i is revealed in the intemal
IPSec connection, and hence we cannot reuse the key. If
the stolen laptop is detected, both of the laptop’s public and
private key pair must be changed before the new initialization.
We also note that we can use the same approach used in the
untrusted server scenario to avoid storing 6 at the firewall, by
encrypting 6 with the firewall’s public key and store it in the
laptop’s hard disk.
The protocol is divided into two phases: the initialization
phase and the key generation phase which are illustrated as
follows.
1. Initialization Phase
If the server is trusted, the initialization values for the
laptop follow the same procedure as in the external protocol.
The additional task is to store 6 at the server as well as the
firewall.
If the server is untrusted, the laptop is required to store a
ticket for 6. The ticket is computed as T~~~t $e,.*(6).

2. Key Generation Phase
First, the laptop requests the server for 6. If the untrusted
server is deployed, the laptop is required to send the ticket.
The server needs to verify the identity of the user. If the
verification succeeds, 6 is sent to the laptop in a secure
form. Laptop can combine this information with its secret
information p to find a common key with another mobile
node. This phase is shown in Protocol 5 in the extended
abstract.
The main differences between the external and intemal
protocol are listed in Table 11.

C. Comparison of our scheme and the existing Mobile IPSKIP scheme
In the following we compare the proposed solution with the
scheme in [17]. Both schemes use SKIP and provide secure
channels between mobile node and the firewall. The scheme
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TABLE 111
COMPARISON OF T H E EXISTINO SKIP-MOBILEIP AND O U R SCHEME

I

Auth. method
Key disabling
feaNre

Ccncml
Extra device
Number of protocols
Server needed

Gupta et PI. (171

Our scheme

Use external device
At the smart card
reader
Use PIN No. with
a sman card
NO

Use password
At the firewall

S m m card reader

NO
2
Yes for the
internal protawl

1

NO

Erua Sfomge
%top

Not required

1””_1

111,.

[7] W. Simpsan, ”The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP):’

Use Schnon’s
indirect proof
Yes
(External)

. store part Of
private key B

1. Veriiieation of Pin
Number at the smart
card reader
2. Process SKIP
operations

Firewall

3. process SKIP

operations

(mirusted ~ e ~ e r )
Store pan of
private key 6
1. Decrypt thc stared
value using password

2. Compute Verification value
3. process SKIP
operations
4. Derive 6
5. Perform Schnon’s
indirect p r w f
6. Process SKIP
operations

in [17]uses a smart card to store the private key and requires

smart card readers. Our scheme requires a small amount of
storage in the laptop’s disk.
Table 111 shows the main differences between
and that of [17].

V.

OUT

RFC 1661, July

1994.

- Stare ticket
No1 required

[4] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, “IP Encapusating Security Payload (ESP),”
RFC 2406, Nov 1998.
[SI A. Aziz, T. Marksan and H. Prafullchandra, “Simple Key-Management
for Internet Protocol (SKIP):’ Internet Draft, August 1996.
[6] R. Droms, “Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol:’ RFC 2131, March

scheme

CONCLUSION

We have given an overview of Mobile IP and its advantages, and reviewed security issues related to Mobile IP. We
considered the case that a device that has stored the private
key of a secure Mobile IP system is lost and protection
must be provided against unauthorized access of the adversary
through the stolen device. We proposed protocols that secure
the Mobile 1P enabled laptop to be used securely inside or
outside the home network.
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